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STATE OF UTAH 
DONNA R. BULLOCK, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
HERBERT JOHN UNGRICHT, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Donna R. Bullock, appeals from a 
judgment for the Defendant-Respondent, on a personal 
injury accident by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial was held on Appellant's claim for personal 
injury which she suffered when her automobile was struck 
Case No. 
13697 
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in the rear by Defendant-Respondent's station wagon just 
east of Highland Drive on 3300 South Street, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and a jury award of no cause of 
action rendered April 4, 1974, before the Honorable Bry-
ant H. Croft, District Judge, of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on which a motion 
for new trial was heard and denied by Judge Croft on 
the 18th day of April, 1974. Upon said judgment and 
the denial of the motion for a new trial by the Court, 
adverse to Plaintiff, this appeal was filed in the Supreme 
Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court below, and a new trial, based upon 
the admission by the Court of evidence of bankruptcy 
and two judgments attendant thereto. Such past bank-
ruptcy and judgments were irrelevant to any legitimate 
issue involved in the trial and were inadmissible upon the 
issue of credibility, the trial judge's basis for admitting 
them. Such admission into evidence was prejudicial 
error. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a case involving a rear end personal injury 
accident. The automobile Appellant was operating, a 
1970 Maverick, was struck in the rear by Respondent's 
automobile, a 1970 Buick station wagon, operated by one 
of the Respondents, Herbert John Ungricbt, son of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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owner. The accident occurred December 16, 1971 at 
about 9:00 o'clock p.m., at approximately 1435 East 3300 
South Street, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Plain-
tiff's car was stopped on 3300 South with the left signal 
blinking, the car positioned in the center-most eastbound 
Ian of traffic on 330 South, waiting to make a left turn 
into the driveway directly east of an apartment building 
numbered 1435 East 3300 South. 
The Respondent driver, with his entire family, had 
left the Hawaiian Restaurant on Highland Drive and 
was proceeding home after dinner, following route south 
on Highland Drive and thence east on 3300 South. While 
waiting to make her turn, Appellant noticed in the rear-
view mirror headlights approaching rapidly. Shortly 
thereafter, there was an impact of the left front of the 
Respondent's station wagon to the right rear of the Ap-
pellant's Maverick. The resultant impact caused personal 
injury to the Appellant which was to eventually result 
in serious injuries including permanent injury to the 
sixth cervical nerve and necessitating the removal of two 
cervical dies. 
There was conflict on the testimony as to what oc-
curred immediately prior to impact, the Respondent's 
witnesses maintaining that Appellant was slowing and 
than moving ahead and slowing and moving ahead just 
prior to impact and the Appellant maintaining that she 
had pulled to a stop and was waiting for traffic to clear 
so that she could make her left hand turn just prior to 
impact. Appellant was examined by a family physician; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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subsequently saw a Dr. Berntson and other experts and 
underwent surgery at Dr. Berntson's hand. There was 
conflict in the medical testimony as is usually the case 
in a hotly contested matter. The accident occurred nine 
(9) days before Christmas, it was dark, and traffic was 
heavy, both cars had their lights on. The area was gen-
erally well lighted being adjacent to Dee's Hamburger 
on the southeast corner of the intersection and floodlights 
for Dee's parking area had it fairly well lighted. 
The medical evidence indicated that after a lengthy 
evaluation, the problems of the Appellant were pinpointed. 
Dr. Berntson operated to remove her two cervical discs. 
Dr. Pettijohn of the University Hospital gave his expert 
medical testimony that the Appellant's injuries involved 
permenent nerve damage to the C-6 nerve route leaving 
loss of feeling and ability in a portion of the right arm. 
This injury is permanent and the Appellant can expect 
little improvement over her present condition. Respon-
dent's medical experts testified contra to the above and 
one, Dr. Martin, expressed his opinion that Mrs. Bullock 
needed no surgery whatever. From the result of the four 
day trial, it is apparent that the jury did not reach the 
question of damages as they returned a verdict for the 
Defendant. The Court, upon motion of the Appellant 
for a new trial, denied the same. 
In the course of cross-examination of Appellant, Re-
spondent's counsel, after going into matters generally 
concerning her age, her family circumstances and a por-
tion of her direct testimony concerning how the accident 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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occurred,, proceeded to interrogate Appellant on her in-
come tax which questions and answers commence at Plage 
395, Line 15 of the transcript. The Court's attention 
is drawn to the questions and answers from Plage 395 
through Page 436 of the transcript which includes ques-
tions by Respondent's counsel of the Appellant on cross-
examination relative to a bankruptcy which was filed in 
April of 1971 by Appellant, the objections of the Appel-
lant's counsel, and the ruling of the Court in relation 
thereto. The Court should particularly note Plage 426 
of the transcript where Appellant's counsel is objecting 
to the introduction of the bankruptcy and any additional 
material related to it. Counsel for the Respondent, in 
answering counsel for Appellant and his objections, in-
dicates commencing at Line 30 on Page 415 of the tran-
script, "I recognize that counsel doesn't like it because" 
(then proceeding to Line of Page 426 of the transcript, 
the then next numbered page) (an error on the part of 
the record) and continues, "in my judgment, it will have 
an adverse effect and that is wy I am seeking to intro-
duce it." The Court allowed the evidence of the bank-
ruptcy into trial for purposes of impeachment of credi-
bility. 
Counsel for Respondent specifically referred to the 
filing of the Bankruptcy Proceeding and previous testi-
mony that he elicited from Appellant thereabout, this 
particular argument having to do with whether or not 
additional exhibits or information related to it would be 
accepted by the Court. 
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Respondent claims for such information a probative 
value related to the injury of Mrs. Bullock and what 
emotional involvement there may have been to that bank-
ruptcy filed eight (8) months prior to the date of the 
accident. There was some testimony from the medical 
witnesses that as a result of their examination, Appellant's 
doctors felt that Mrs. Bullock was emotionally upset at 
the time she was examined. Respondent's counsel urged 
on Court and jury that this could have been aggravated 
by the filing of the bankruptcy as a pre-existing condi-
tion* 
Appellant urged, at that time, upon the Court and 
jury that the filing of a bankruptcy eight (8) months 
prior to an automobile rear end collision, as was the case 
before it, had little and really nothing to do with the 
case at bar. 
The Appellant sought to withdraw any claim con-
cerning lost wages after the ruling of the trial court be-
low that the same were speculative. The Court denied 
said motion. Respondent insisted on the retention of 
the references to the bankruptcy and the examination 
recorded of the Appellant on the theory of credibility 
impeachment and relevancy to the issue of a lost earn-
ings, though this issue was removed from consideration 
by the trial court below. 
From the foregoing Statement of Facts, the Appel-
lant respectfully submits her argument as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
D E F E N D A N T S TO INTRODUCE EVI-
DENCE OF SPECIFIC ACTS OF PRIOR 
ALLEGED MISCONDUCT TO IMPEACH 
PLAINTIFF'S CREDIBILITY. 
Other than showing a conviction for a crime amount-
ing to a felony for dishonesty or false statement, the 
Court below could not permit evidence that the Appel-
lant-witness had committed wrongful acts or that she 
had "bad character". The Supreme Court of the State 
of Washington enunciated the general rule that evidence 
of specific acts of misconduct which tend to disgrace a 
witness cannot be elicited from the witness on cross-ex-
amination for purposes of impeaching him, or attacking 
his credibility. In the Washington case, Warren vs. Hynes, 
Wash. (1940), 102 P. 2d 691, an action by a minor through 
a guardian ad litem, for a personal injury sustained to 
the minor in an automobile accident, the trial resulted 
in a verdict for the Respondent. As part of the evidence^ 
the trial court allowed a question relative to the occupa-
tion of the party, to which the answer was given "none". 
On further examination, it was apparent that the purpose 
of the question was disclosure of the fact that Defendant 
made his living in the past stealing automobiles as a 
means of livelihood or as one of his main activities. The 
Court states at Page 696: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The mere query whether appellant's occu-
pation had been that of an automobile thief, 
which question was not material to the issues in 
the cause, was intended to, and doubtless did, 
arouse the animosity of the jury toward appel-
lant and he was thereby denied a fair trial. State 
vs. Tweedy, 165 Wash. 281, 5 P. 2d 335; State 
vs. Devlin, 145 Wash. 44, 258 P. 826. To further 
interrogate Warren, whose character was not an 
issue, as to whether he had "held up" the two 
men standing in the court room was additional 
reversible error. 
Further, in the same case, the court held that the 
answer of a witness on cross-examination on collateral 
matters regarding specific acts which would show past 
conduct was reversible error. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide for impeach-
ment of a witness because a witness' character for truth-
fulness is always an issue. Utah Rules of Evidence 20 
provides: 
. . . any party including the party calling 
him may examine him and introduce extrinsic 
evidence concerning any statement or conduct 
by him and any other matter relevant upon the 
issues of credibility. 
For public policy reasons, Rule 20 was specifically 
made subject to Rules 21 and 22. Rule 21, the modern 
view, provides that conviction of a crime not involving 
dishonesty shall be inadmissible to impair credibility. 
Rule 22 (c) and (d) provide: 
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(c) evidence of traits of his character 
other troth, honesty, or integrity of their oppo-
sites, shall be inadmissible; 
(d) evidence of specific instances of his 
conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait 
of his character, shall be inadmissible. 
As can be seen, affecting the credibility of a witness, 
Rule 22(c) provides that evidence of traits of character 
other than truth, honesty, or integrity or their opposites, 
shall be inadmissible; and Rule 22(d), provides that 
evidence of specific instances of conduct relevant only 
as tending to prove a trait of character, shall be inad-
missible. Such Rules are the limiting rules on impeach-
ment of credibility by showing bad character. 
Such evidence is admissible if it qualifies under Rules 
46 and 47. For clarity, these rules are set forth in en-
tirety as follows: 
Rule 46. Character — Manner of Proof 
When a person's character or a trait of his 
character is in issue, it may be proved by testi-
mony in the form of opinion, evidence of repu-
tation, or evidence of specific instances of the 
person's conduct, subject, however, to the limi-
tations of Rules 47 and 48. 
Rule 47. Character Trait as Proof of Con-
duct 
Subject to Rule 48, when a trait of a person's 
character is relevant as tending to prove his con-
duct on a specified occasion, such trait may be 
proved in the same manner as provided by Rule 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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46, except that (a) evidence of specific instances 
of conduct other than evidence of conviction of 
a crime which tends to prove the trait to be bad 
shall be inadmissible, and (b) in a criminal action 
evidence of a trait of an accused's character as 
tending to prove his guilt or innocence of the 
offense charged, (i) may not be excluded by the 
judge under Rule 45 if offered by the accused 
to prove his innocence, and (ii) if offered by the 
prosecution to prove his guilt, may be admitted 
only after the accused has introduced evidence of 
his good character. 
It is clear from the Utah Rules of Evidence that 
character is to be proven by reputation, opinion, or spe-
cific acts tending to prove conduct on a specific occasion. 
I t was for the foregoing reasons that the Court in Warren, 
supra, held that the motorist's occupation was not ma-
terial to issues in an action for a personal injury sustained 
in a collision and that examination thereon denied the 
motorist a "fair trial". 
As can be seen from the trial transcript in the case 
at hand, the very right protected by the above Rules 
was breached. When Respondent attempted to introduce 
testimony of a bankruptcy, objection was made to such 
introduction (T. 396,9 and T. 396.25). The specific rea-
son for such objection was given (T. 413.21). 
Respondent thereupon pointed out that he sought 
to introduce such evidence to attack Appellant's credibil-
ity by showing her poor business ethics (T. 415.13-14) 
(T. 426.1-3). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Professor Phillip Schuchman, in his much quoted 
summary of the law, An Attempt at a Philosophy of 
Bankruptcy, 21 U.C.L.A. L.R. 403, 1971, points out 
that at law, the ethical position of bankruptcy, is that 
of simple, fairly conventional utihtarianism. By putting 
the entire question into its realistic context, we realize 
the fallacy, according to Professor Shuchman, of in-
sisting by our Victorian notions, that the moral man will 
pay his debts regardless of business misfortune. 
Bankruptcy, therefore, is not amoral or a "dirty 
word". Yet there is need to recognize the impact on the 
private citizen or the general member of the community. 
To him, bankruptcy is a "dirty word". Such a reality 
caused Professor Shuchman to point out that: 
(2) The process of personal bankruptcy 
need not be made unpleasant; and, in the absence 
of ethical consensus and more information on the 
psychological consequences of bankruptcy, should 
not be degrading and should avoid stigmatiz-
ing. Id. at Page 474. (Emphasis ours.) 
Since it is clear that a bankruptcy has little to do 
with ethics, the obvious purpose was to lay a found-
dation for the introduction of specific acts of misconduct 
or misrepresentation connected therewith (T. 415.8) (T. 
415.30) (T. 426.1 and 2). 
The Court allowed the introduction of such evidence 
over Appellant's objection, because Appellant had in-
troduced prior testimony of lost earnings (T. 429.22). 
However, after conversation with counsel, the Court re-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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moved the issue of business earnings from the jury's de-
termination, but still allowed the bankruptcy evidence 
and acknowledgment of Appellant as to the two judg-
ments theron to remain (T. 433.17). In other words, the 
trial court was recognizing the fact that bankruptcy is 
a "dirty word" and that it could be used to question the 
Appellant's credibility. 
Specific attention is diiiected to the court's direction 
on the allowance of the evidence (T. 432.21). The Court 
pointed out correctly that Rule 22(c) provides for ad-
missibility of traits of character for truth, honesty or 
integrity, or their opposites. However,, the Court foiled 
to recognize the limitation placed upon (c) by consider-
ing (d): 
Rule 22 (d) evidence of specific instances of 
his conduct relevant only as tending to prove 
a trait of his character, shall be inadmissible." 
For these reasons the ruling of the trial court was 
contrary to law, and beyond the judge's power of discre-
tion, and the Court's ruling was error. 
An additional case supports the above position. In 
United States vs. John David Provoo, (2 Cir., 1954), 215 
F. 2d 531, the Court held that in the prosecution of a 
former army staff sergeant for treason alleged to have 
been committed while he was a Japanese prisoner of war, 
the District Court's permission to cross-examine the De-
fendant as to whether his homosexuality was the real 
cause of his confinements, to which he testified on direct 
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examination, was error prejudicial to the Defendant so 
as to require a reversal of his conviction. The Court held, 
stating the proposition as enunciated heretofore within 
the limits of the Rules of Evidence, that when a person 
takes the witness stand and subjects himself to cross-
examination, held, like other witnesses, may have his cred-
ibility impeached. But this could not be done by intro-
ducing specific acts of misconduct by him, not resulting 
in his conviction for a felony or a crime of moral turpi-
tude, and these were improper subjects of cross-examina-
tion for such purpose. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURTS ADMISSION OF 
SPECIFIC ACTS OF PRIOR MISCONDUCT 
TO ATTACK PLAINTIFF'S CREDIBILITY 
PREJUDICED PLAINTIFF'S CASE AND 
RESULTED IN REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Below, the Respondent urged upon the Court the 
argument that the inclusion of the evidence of bankruptcy 
was germain to the issue of emotional upset of some sort 
of "overlay" on the theory that some of the complainte 
Appellant had were really the result of the alleged trauma 
she suffered as a result of her filing the bankruptcy eight 
(8) months earlier, and not solely as a result of the per-
sonal injury received in the accident.. However, Appelltnt 
testified of permanent nerve damage and removal of two 
cervical discs (T. 231, 232, 233). Such testimony was 
corroborated by Appellant's expert witnesses (T. 336.12) 
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(T. 336, 337, 338, 339) (T. 464, 465). One such expert 
verified that the medical condition of the Appellant were 
consistent with the nature of the rear end collision which 
occurred (T. 462). 
The Court's error was to allow this evidence of bank-
ruptcy to remain on the issue of credibility. That error 
was further compounded by the Court instructing counsel 
for the Respondent that he leeway to so argue to the 
jury when the Court, in fact, had ruled as a matter of law 
that any evidence concerning lost wages was going to 
to be excluded. This was prejudicial to the Appellant 
and denied her a fair trial. 
A case that well evidences the danger of this kind 
of latitude being exercised by a trial court and the dam-
age that can occur therefrom is Champion vs. Brooks 
Transportation Company, Inc., Stoneberry vs. Same, 77 
U. S. App, D. C. 293, 135 F. 2d 652, (1943). This was 
a person injury action by the occupants of an automobile 
struck by the Defendant's truck. Evidence was introduced 
at trial that (1) the occupants of the oar on perhaps a 
half dozen occasions had visited a specific night club in 
the greater metropolitan Washington, D. C. area, (2) 
that one of the occupants of the automobile had gambled 
at this night club and had in fact gambled there on the 
night of the accident, and (3) that the oocupants of the 
car who were struck in the rear, were aware that the 
automobile they occupied was furnished to them by the 
night club owner. The Appellate Court says on age 655: 
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The single issue on which we may take cog-
nizance is the admissibility of the evidence, over 
Plaintiff's objection, that they had on perhaps 
a half a dozen occasions visited the Maryland 
Athletic Club, apparently "Jimmie LaFontaine's 
Place": that one of the Plaintiffs had gambled 
thereon on those occasions and had gambled 
there on the night of the accident; and that the 
Plaintiffs were aware that the car occupied by 
them, which was returning them to the District, 
was furnished by "LaFontaine". The Court 
wisely states the General Rules of Evidence with 
counsel of such standing parading the name of 
"Jimmie LaFontaine's Place" through pages and 
pages of cross-examination, we assume the jury 
may have assumed that the "Maryland Athletic 
Club" and "Jimmie LaFontaine's Place" were 
synonymout terms . . . It might have been used 
and repeated to produce a disagreeable taste in 
the jury's mouth. 
The Court further held that conviction of a gambling 
crime would not have been admissible on the witnesses' 
credibility, neither would the testimony of indecent ex-
posure have permitted the introduction of evidence rela-
tive to a Defendant's credibility of prior illicit sex rela-
tions. The Court had held that a further case, Sanford 
vs. United States, 69 App. D. C. 44, 98 F. 2d 325, (1938), 
would not permit evidence of a mere charge of disorderly 
conduct or of an arrest for disorderly conduct to be ad-
missible to effect credibility. The Appellate Court held 
that the admission of the contested evidence was preju-
dicial error compelling the reversal of the judgment and 
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the Court remanded the cases back to the trial courts 
for conformity with their opinion. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania further held in 
Commonwealth vs. Truitt, 39 Pa. 72, 85 A. 2d 425, 30 
A. L. R. 2d 572, (1953), that admission of evidence of 
communistic connections in a criminal prosecution con-
stituted reversible error. The Court, in this case involv-
ing assault, battery, resisting an officer and obstructing 
an arrest, stated on Page 527 as follows: 
In rebuttal the Commonwealth offered the 
testimony of Matt Cvetic, who styled himself 
"an undercover agent with the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation". His testimony was offered to 
attack the credibility of Defendant Truitt's tes-
timony when he denied that he was a commu-
nist. An objection was then entered by the 
attorney for Defendants, which was overruled 
and an exception allowed.. The witness was per-
mitted to testify that Truitt was an active com-
munist, and gave testimony concerning Truitt's 
communist activities. This was clearly error. 
Truitt's testimony, on cross-examination, that he 
was not a communist was obviously upon a col-
lateral matter. A witness cannot be contradicted 
on collateral matters to test credibility. 
Secondly, the Court stated at 30 A. L. R. 2d 578: 
Defendant Truitt, without objection, was 
cross-examined concerning his membership in the 
Progressive Party, and whether or not such po-
litical party was "dominated by communists". 
Here again, such testimony was without the 
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slightest probative or relevant value. If it had 
been objected to it ought to have been excluded. 
In the instant case, evidence of a prior bankruptcy 
in a personal injury suit is evidence of prior specific acts. 
Aside from the fact that a bankruptcy does not show 
bad character under the law, the evidence could not be 
admitted under any exception to the general rules above 
set forth. 
The consideration of two exceptions will complete the 
discussion on impeachment. In People v. Hurlburt, 166 
Cal. App, 2d 334, 33 P. 2d 82, 75 A. L. R. 2d 500, (1958), 
the Court was confronted with a prosecution for lewd 
conduct. The Court first discussed an exception to the 
general rule above by saying, "In sex cases of various 
sorts, exceptions to its application have been recognized." 
Secondly, the Court stated: 
The rule contained in Section 2051 is a sound 
one, and exists in most jurisdictions. It is that, 
while a witness may be impeached "by evi-
dence that his general reputation for truth, hon-
esty, or integrity is bad", evidence of specific 
acts of bad character, except as to conviction of 
a felony, is generally not admissible. But where 
the issue goes beyond general reputation and in-
volves the truthfulness of the basic fact in issue, 
evidence of particular wrongful acts may be ad-
missible. 
Additionally, Hockaday vs. Redline, Inc., 85 U. S. 
App. D. C. 1, 174 F. 2d 154, (1949), a personal injury 
action, is supportive of this view. This Court denied an 
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appeal from a judgment after a jury verdict in favor of 
the Appellee, where a motion for a new trial was filed 
and denied. The specific issue was whether the conduct 
of the Appellee's counsel, both in a cross-examination 
and in argument, was calculated to prejudice the jury 
against the Appellant to the extent that a new trial 
would be warranted. 
The Appellant filed to recover damages for certain 
injuries sustained when the Defendant's truck was in 
a collision with the Plaintiff. The Court held that in a 
personal injury action, cross-examination as to a prior 
conviction of assault for impeachment purposes, was 
proper, but that further cross-examination to show re-
vocation of a suspended sentence because of Plaintiff's 
failure to enter the military service, was prejudicial to 
the Plaintiff and constituted reversible error. The Court 
further stated that it is the duty of Court and counsel 
to prevent the jury from considering extraneous issues, 
irrelevant evidence and erroneous views of the law. That 
duty, the Court pointed out, extended to guarding the 
jury against influence of passion and prejudice so that 
the parties may obtain a fair and impartial trial. The 
Court further stated, that the failure of the Court or 
counsel to discharge this duty constitutes reversible error. 
The 6th Circuit is in accord. In Smith vs. U. S., (6th 
Cir. 1960), 283 F. 2d 16, the Defendant was convicted of 
telephoning a false bomb threat to an airport control 
tower. The Court held that without proper foundation, 
collateral matters were properly excluded. Thereupon, 
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the Court, in summarizing the rules set forth above, stated 
as follows: 
The type of questions permitted to impeach 
a witness are those which show that he com-
mitted a felony or crime involving moral turpi-
tude. 
It would not be proper to show for impeach-
ment purposes that the witness had been con-
victed of disorderly conduct, of violating the 
traffic law of either state or municipality or 
that he was convicted of crimes not involving 
moral turpitude. 
The act of permitting testimony of a bankruptcy to 
remain in evidence after removing the issue of business 
earnings was one of allowing a collateral issue of a sup-
posed specific misconduct to remain for the purpose of 
impeachment. As such, the ruling of the lower court 
should be held reversible error. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJU-
DICIAL ERROR IN THAT WHEN APPEL-
LANT SOUGHT TO OFFER EXPLANATORY 
EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE BANK-
R U P T C Y T H E T R I A L C O U R T AN-
NOUNCED THAT IF SUCH EXPLANATORY 
EVIDENCE WERE INTRODUCED, THE 
COURT WOULD PERMIT THE INTRODUC-
TION OF TWO DOCUMENTS WHICH HAD 
BEEN PROFFERED BY RESPONDENTS 
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AND MARKED "12D", BUT WHICH DOCU-
MENTS CONTAINED HIGHLY INFLAM-
M A T O R Y MATERIAL DESIGNED TO 
PREJUDICE THE APPELLANT. 
Counsel for appellant pointed out to the trial court 
that if the bankruptcy evidence were allowed to remain 
in, the appellant would have to come back with an ex-
planation of the bankruptcy, all of which would unneces-
sarily consume the time of the trial court (T. 427.9-10) 
(T. 431.21-28) (T. 432.1-6). Rule 45 was emphasized 
to the court. 
The trial court refused to allow appellant to offer 
any explanation for the bankruptcy without precdipitating 
the admission of proffered Exhibit 12D into evidence (T. 
434.1-17). 
The ruling of the trial court in refusing to permit 
appellant to offer any explanation of the bankruptcy 
without effecting the introduction of the highly inflam-
matory proffered 12D into evidence placed the appellant 
in an impossible position and highly prejudiced the case 
of the appellant. This was truly error on the part of the 
trial court and said error deprived the plaintiff of a fair 
trial. The facts of the accident are quite simple and the 
testimony of the appellant, if believed by the jury, would 
require a verdict in her favor (T. 222-258). The jury 
was out approximately five hours wrestling the matter 
of liability. It is perfectly obvious that the problem was 
the credibility of the plaintiff which had been seriously 
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and erroneously damaged by the aforesaid errors of the 
trial court. The action of the trial court in holding prof-
fered Exhibit 12D over her head and threatening to use 
it as a sword if she sought to explain why she took bank-
ruptcy is almost incredible. Either 12D was proper evi-
dence or it was not. We have demonstrated that it was 
not. The court, in referring to said proffered exhibit, 
said that it "suggests a dishonest thing" (T. 432.20 
through T. 433.11). The respondents were, once again, 
seeking to destroy the crediibility of the appellant by 
using a specific instance of her conduct to influence the 
jury to believe that the appellant was dishonest and not 
to be trusted. The threat of the trial court to allow this 
improper evidence to be received if the appellant sought 
to explain the reasons why she took bankruptcy and the 
reasons for the business failure was highly prejudicial 
and unfair to the appellant. There is no question about 
the fact that the appellant was highly prejudiced in the 
eyes of the jury. 
There is no question about the fact that it was error 
for the trial court to permit evidence of appellant's bank-
ruptcy to be admitted. There is no question about the 
fact that said bankruptcy evidence was prejudicial to the 
credibility of the plaintiff. In fact, the court made it very 
clear that counsel for the respondents was free to argue 
to the question of credibility of the plaintiff as a result 
of the bankruptcy. It is obvious that the evidence of the 
bankruptcy shook the faith of the jurors in the appellant, 
particularly since since she was not allowed to offer any 
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explanation whatsoever for having taken the bankruptcy. 
She was prepared to offer an explanation which would 
have made her look much tetter before the jury. The 
court, however, used the threat of allowing improper evi-
dence to come in to effectively prevent the appellant 
from giving such explanation to the jury. This was gross 
error of a highly prejudicial nature. It definitely de-
prived the appellant of a fair trial and, without question, 
affected the outcome of the trial. When a jury can spend 
five hours on the mere question of liability in a relatively 
simple rear-end automobile collision, it is obvious that 
they were concerned about the credibility of the appel-
lant. Furthermore, the verdict, as the record will show 
was a split verdict, with only six voting in favor of the 
verdict. There is every reason to believe that the result 
would have been different had the aforesaid prejudicial 
errors not been committed. 
POINT IV. 
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT S I N C E T H E 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
BECAUSE EVIDENCE OF SPECIFIC ACTS 
WAS INTRODUCED TO ATTACK PLAIN-
TIFF'S CREDIBILITY. 
In Woodhouse vs. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P. 
2d 442, (1968), the Utah Supreme Court stated that on 
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appeal it is the duty of the Court to assume that the jury 
believed all the evidence that supports their verdict and 
for that reason the Court would review the evidence and 
whatever inferences can fairly and reasonably be drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to it. 
Generally, a motion or other application for a new 
trial is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, 
but as sitated above, the presumption is that the trial 
court properly exercised its discretion. See 55 A. L. R. 
2d 884. 
The general exception thereto is well stated in 58 
Am. Jur. 2d Page 443 as follows: 
However, the granting or refusal of a new 
trial on account of alleged errors of law occur-
ring in the course of a trial, is not a matter of 
discretion and is fully subject to review by the 
appellate court. 
The same section of 58 Am. Jur. 2d at P&ge 434 
states: 
Ctaxiinarily a motion or other application for 
a new trial is directed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court, and on appeal from an order en-
tared by the trial court in the exercise of discre-
tion the presumption is that the trial court prop-
erly exercised its discretion. However, the grant-
ing or refusal of a new trial on account of alleged 
errors of law occurring in the course of the trial 
is not a matter of discretion and is fully subject 
to review by the appellate court. 
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It would follow logically from the quoted material 
above, that on grounds other than errors of law, the ma-
terial must be prejudicial, but the reverse is true, as to 
errors of law or mixed errors of law and fact. These need 
not be prejudicial to constitute reversible error. 
Additionally, "where comments by a trial judge in-
dicate that he misconceived his duty, the appellate court 
will not blindly affirm the judgment below because there 
is some evidence to support it." (People vs. Robarge, 
41 Cal. 2d 628, 262 P. 2d 14, (1953); cf. Ehrenreich vs. 
Shelton, 213 Cal. App. 2d 375, 28 Cal. Rptr. 855, 1963); 
Smith vs. Fetterhoff, 140 Cal. App. 2d 471, 295 P. 2d 474, 
(1956); Cosnell vs. Webb, 60 Cal. App. 2d 1, 139 P. 2d 
985, (1943). 
In the case at bar, regardless of the court's belief 
that the issue and evidence of bankruptcy went to credi-
bility, or was justified on the basis of previous testimony 
of evidence of prior earnings, it can manifestly be seen 
that the court misconstrued the situation and in fact 
allowed questions concerning a specific act, "bankruptcy", 
at a different time and for a different purpose than the 
matter at trial. This misconception on the part of the 
court is further buttressed by the inclusion of Instruction 
No. 20 as follows: 
At the beginning of this trial it was stated 
that Plaintiff was claiming as an element of dam-
ages, a loss of earnings of $1,000 per month from 
a company recently formed and about to com-
mence business. During the trial, testimony has 
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been given with respect to such alleged salary. 
Under the la wof the state of Utah, speculative 
damages are not recoverable and based upon the 
evidence presented during the trial the court has 
ruled as a matter of law that the claimed loss of 
earnings is too speculative to merit any consid-
eration of the evidence presented ameerning such 
claimed loss. 
Consequently, the testimony regarding the 
alleged loss of earnings is to be disregarded by 
you and should your verdict be in favor of the 
Plaintiff, you are not to make any award to her 
for such claimed loss of earnings and you are 
not to consider evidence relating thereto in de-
tennining what amount of damages, if any, should 
be awarded to Plaintiff (T. 659). 
Just prior to this objection to Instruction 20, counsel 
for the Respondent, displayed his basic reason for elicit-
ing this testimony by stating, "The only prior history 
which we have is in her prior business venture. She 
flailed and a bankruptcy ensued" (T. 651). 
Immediately thereafter, the couri; made the further 
siiatement showing its predisposition: 
But in addition to that, the positive evidence 
indicated that in the prior year or so in which 
Mrs. Bullock was engaged in a similar type of 
activity to be undertaken in the corporation, that 
she had in fact ended up in the banlotiptcy court 
(T. 652). 
It is clear that the Supreme Court will reverse an 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
order granting a new trial when the record shows that 
the trial court erred in an unmixed question of law. Okla-
homa City vs. Wilson, 310 R 2d 369, (1968). 
Further, it is clearly stated as a matter of evidence 
relative to impeachment and credibility that acts of mis-
conduct,, not resulting in a cx>nviction of a crime of dis-
honesty, are not proper subjects of cross-examination to 
impeach a witness. In Packineau vs. United States, 8th 
Cir., (1953), 202 F. 2d 681, a prosecution for violation 
of the white slave act, where evidence was in conflict, 
not overwhelming either way, it was held that the trial 
court erred prejudicially in permitting the Defendant to 
be cross-examined as to prior arrests for Mann Act vio-
lations and in permitting rebuttal testimony of an F. B. I. 
Agent when it was attempted to show that the Defendant 
had previously admitted such an arrest. The Court of 
Appeals of the 8th Circuit further stated the validity of 
the Rule that acts of misconduct, not resulting in con-
viction of a crime, are not proper subjects of cross-ex-
amination to impeach. 
The same view was held by the Utah Supreme Court 
in State of Utah vs. Cazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P. 2d 
406, (1963). The Court pointed out that details or cir-
cumstances surrounding felonies for which the accused 
has been convicted may not be inquired into upon cross-
examination of an accused except under unusual circum-
stances, such as when inquiry would tend to show a 
scheme, plan or modus operandi. The Court in the con-
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curring opinion mentions the case of State vs. Hougen-
sen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229, (1936), as setting forth 
the areas of cross-examination and setting forth the do's 
and doot's related thereto. That, of course, included the 
opportunity to ask one on a cross-examination whether 
he had been convicted of a felony, but it is limited to 
that as properly pointed out by the Court. 
In the case at bar, not only did counsel for the Re-
spondent elicit information relative to Appellant's filing 
of bankruptcy, but further inquired relative to two judg-
ments that were obtained against her as a result thereof, 
raising a question of alleged misconduct on the part of 
the Appellant. In light of the strict rules followed by 
this jurisdiction and most others, this was clearly error 
on the part of counsel and error on the part of the court 
to make such an inquiry because the inquiry was relative 
to specific acts and as such were not permitted for pur-
poses of impeachment. Certainly, these errors account 
for the no cause of action verdict against the Appellant, 
who was merely sitting in her stopped automobile when 
the Respondent caused the rear end collision which re-
sulted in Appellant's serious injuries. 
CONCLUSION 
In the case at bar, the Court allowed testimony of 
a specific act, a collateral matter, to attack the credibility 
of the Appellant. That was a clear breach of the Court's 
duty, was an error of law, and as such was not even re-
quired to be prejudicial, but was in fact, prejudicial to 
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a fair hearing on the part of the Appellant. Therefore, 
the Court's action was reversible error and a new trial 
should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HATCH & PLUMB 
By 
Qrrin G. Hatch 
By 
Winston Langlois 
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